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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STAT$ OF UTAH

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Petition tfo,

ROLAND W. REICHERT,
Defendant and Petitioner.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR DENIAL OF REVIEW
1.

Whether reversal and remand of the case for a new

trial on the issue of damages was in conflict with any decision
of this court.
2.

Whether reversal and remand of the case to enter

judgment for the undisputed attorneys1 fees, or make findings
supporting their reduction, is in conflict with any decision of
this court, or violates petitioner's procedural rights.
3.

Whether affirmance of the trial court's denial of a

motion to add a counterclaim departed from the usual course of
judicial proceedings to the extent calling for this court's exercise of its power of supervision.

COURT OF APPEALS CITATION
The opinion issued by the court of appeals is reported
unofficially in 122 Adv.Rpts. 46, The official report has not
been published.
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
1.

The decision sought to be reviewed was entered on

November 24, 1989.
2.

There was no petition for rehearing.

An order was

entered by this court granting to petitioner until and including
January 23f 1990, within which to petition for certiorari.
3.

There is no cross-petition.

4.

The statutory authority for exercise of jurisdic-

tion in this case is 78-2-2(5) Utah Code Annotated 1953.
CONTROLLING LAWS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or regulations involved in this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Regional Sales Agency ("Regional") brought this action
to enforce provisions of an agreement of August 13, 1979 (Petition, Appendix B) restricting the right of defendant ("Reichert")
to compete with Regional.

Reichert defended on the ground that

the agreement he signed was not intended to have a legal effect,
- 2-

was without consideration, and was a sham (R.28-33); and counterclaimed, on the ground that Regional had induced him to enter
into the agreement by fraudulent representations as to its
purpose.
Reichert performed services for Regional as a salesman
from September 1, 1977, through December 31, 1983 (Tr. 9, 15-17,
136).

During his tenure with Regional, Reichert represented a

number of the principals of the company and Was the primary, if
not the sole, contact of Regional Sales Agency with its principals and customers (Tr. 241). According to t^he agreement, the
"principals" were factories, manufacturers, a^na others selling
products in territories assigned to Regional,
Reichert testified that during his tenure, Regional
represented Artfaire, Carousel Party Product^ and Atlas Textiles,
and that after he left the company, he represented those principals (Tr. 99). In answers to interrogatories, Reichert stated,
under oath, that he had received from Artfaire, Atlas Textiles
and Carousel Party Products during the three jyears following
December 31, 1983, commissions totalling $42,176.09 (Exhibit
"P-9").

The case was tried to a jury, but prior to the submis-

sion of the case, the parties stipulated that the attorneys' fees
to be awarded, if any, would be determined by the court after
- 3-

return of the jury's verdict.

The jury found in favor of

Regional, but assessed damages in the amount of only $792.18, and
volunteered that the parties should pay their own attorneys'
fees.
After rendition of the verdict, Regional submitted to
the court a sworn statement, together with a summary of services
performed and the purposes for which they were performed,
together with an affidavit that reasonable fees and costs totaled
$27,350.90 (R. 313-325).

No objection was made to the affidavit,

no motion was made to strike it, and no counteraffidavit was
filed by Reichert.

The court considered the matter on its law

and motion calendar at which time, without a hearing, it reduced
to $7,500 the attorneys' fees to be awarded to Regional.

At that

time the court also denied Regional's motion for a judgment
n.o.v. and for a new trial.
The finding that the noncompetition agreement was valid
and enforceable was not appealed by Reichert.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The Reversal of the Trial Court's Judgment and Remand
of the Case for a New Trial on Damages Alone was Based
Upon Prior Decisions of This Court
Paragraph "L" of the 1979 agreement between Regional
and Reichert contained the following provision:
At no time during the term of this agreement, or
within a period of three years following the termination of Agent's employment shall Agent, for himself or
in behalf of any other person, firni, partnership or
corporation, (other than Company) rjepresent any principal of company for the purpose of selling any of the
products; nor will he with respect to the Products in
any way, directly or indirectly, fdr himself * * *
solicit, divert, or take away any Principal of Company
during the term of this agreement qr for the three
years following the termination of Agent's employment.

In the event Agent breaches the provisions of this
paragraph, all proceeds and benefits derived therefrom
by Agent shall be received and held by him in trust for
Company, and shall be paid to Company upon demand by
Company. (R-ll).
On the basis of this provision and Reichert's own
admission that he had received $42,176.09 for representing three
i

of the principals of the company during the three years following
termination of his employment, Regional askeq for the following
instruction to the jury:
Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in addition to
any other damages, that it may prove by a preponderance
- 5 -

of the evidence, all commissions received by defendant
during the years 1984, 1985, and 1986, from Artfaire,
Carousel Party Favors, Inc. and Atlas Textiles.
The court refused to give Regional1s requested instruction No. 8, but gave the following instruction:
Where the parties agree on a method of establishing damages for breach of contract, the agreement is
enforceable if it is designed to provide fair compensation for the breach, based upon a reasonable relation
to actual damages.
Regional1 s request for instructions was based by the
decision of this court in Young Electric Sign Co. v. United Standard West, 755 P.2d 162, 164 (1988), in which the trial court had
held that in order for the plaintiff to establish his liquidated
damages, it had to prove actual damages.

This court reversed and

remanded for entry of judgment in accordance with the liquidated
damages provision of the contract, saying:
In general, contractual damages are measured by
the lost benefit of the bargain, i.e., "the amount necessary to place the non-breaching party in as good a
position as if the contract had been performed."
Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982). However,
as a general rule, parties to a contract may agree to
liquidated damages in case they breach, and such agreements are enforceable if the amount of liquidated damages agreed to is not disproportionate to the possible
compensatory damages and does not constitute a forfeiture or a penalty. Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47
(Utah 1983). Reasonable liquidated damages provisions
may reduce the cost of liquidation by obviating the
expense entailed in proving actual damages. If a
- 6-

liquidated damages provision is enforceable, a plaintiff need not prove actual damages. [citations omitted.] The burden is on the party who would avoid a
liquidated damages provision to prove that no damages
were suffered or that there is no reasonable relationship between compensatory and liquidated damages.
[Emphas i s added.]
The court of appeals relied upon Young Electric Sign in
deciding this case, noting that "Mr. Reichert does not point to
any evidence offered below to show that the liquidated damages
provision was unreasonable."
It is also generally held that a determination of the
enforceability of a liquidated damages provision is a matter for
the court and not the jury.

Chaff in v. Ramsey, 276 Or. 551, 555

P.2d 459, 462 (1976); In re Construction Diversification, Inc.y
36 B.R. 434, 436 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Corvino y. 910 South Boston
Realty Co. . 332 P.2d 15, 18 (Okl. 1958); 22 iVm. Jur.2d, Damages,
S 692.
II.
The court of appeals followed accepted procedures in
reversing and remanding the case to either enter
judgment for the undisputed attorneys' fees or make
findings supporting the reduction made by the trial
court.
Regional1s motion for award of attorneys1 fees was
called up for hearing on the law and motion calendar at which
time it was heard by the court without setting it for a hearing
- 7-

or taking any testimony with respect to it. The court simply
asked counsel for Reichert what he thought, whereupon he suggested to the court that ten times the amount of judgment would
be excessive and unreasonable, whereupon Judge Brian entered
attorneys1 fees in the amount of $7,500, a few dollars less than
ten times the jury's verdict (Petitioner's brief, p. 10).
Petitioner has argued that since no record was made of
the proceeding, the court should assume that the record supports
the judgment.

There is, however, a record of the relief sought

and the court's ruling, but no findings of fact as required by
Rule 52, U.R.Civ.P.

This was not the type of motion exempted by

the rule.
The cases cited by petitioner do not touch upon the
issue that was before the trial court.

Powers v. Gene's Building

Materials, 567 P.28 174 (Utah 1977) dealt with failure to grant
an off-the-record motion for disqualification of a judge.

In

Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982), the trial
judge did announce a reason for his action on attorneys' fees,
and in First Security Bank of Utah v. Wright, 521 P.2d 563, 567
(Utah 1974), the trial court had made and entered findings of
fact.
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In Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1985),
this court said:
An award of attorneys' fees must generally be made on
the basis of findings of fact supported by the evidence
and appropriate conclusions of law.
Factors to be considered in an attorneys' fee award, as
set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 989 (Utah
1988), included the amount of the judgment, and if this is what
motivated the court, there is no problem in sending it back
because the judgment is certain to be increased.
III.
The Trial Court's Denial of Petitioner's Motion
to Add a Counterclaim Was Not an Abuse of Discretion
The complaint in this case was filed on January 26,
1984, and Reichert was served on February 1. ' His answer and
counterclaim averred that the agreement of August 13, 1979, was a
"sham" and was never intended by the parties Ito have any legal
effect, and that Regional1s attempt to enforce the agreement was
fraudulent because of representations made to Reichert as to the
purpose of the agreement.

The pleadings rema ined the same

through the discovery period and until the tr ial, which commenced
on May 1, 1987, before The Honorable Leonard H. Russon, without a
jury.

On the day before the trial, Reichert filed a counterclaim
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seeking to raise the issue of whether, throughout the period from
1977 through 1983, Regional had paid to him all of the commissions to which he was entitled under the 1979 agreement.

On

motion of Regional at the trial on May 1, 1987, the tendered
counterclaim was stricken.
In his petition, Reichert states that "Due to the conduct of Mrs. Kiholm while testifying and the responsive conduct
of the bench, Judge Russon, in chambers with counsel for petitioner present, offered to recuse himself, and that offer was
subsequently accepted by petitioner."

The statement about the

conduct of Mrs. Kiholm is not in the record, and it is not true.
The problem arose because of Reichert's counsel's continuing to
argue with the court after rulings upon objections to evidence,
and the judge's calling him into chambers to chastise him for it.
It was because of the judge's anger that he offered to recuse
himself, but thereafter said he would continue the trial unless
Reichert insisted on the recusal, which Reichert did.After a mistrial was declared, the case was assigned to
The Honorable Pat B. Brian, whereupon petitioner's motion to add

Although this is not in the record, either, untrue statements of the type made by counsel in the petition should not
go unchallenged.
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a counterclaim designated as a "motion to amend" the counterclaim, was renewed.

Judge Brian denied the motion and denial of

the motion was proper under the rules and the decisions of this
court.
Although Reichert purported to be moving pursuant to
Rules 15(a) and (d), U.R.Civ.P., the motion had to be under Rule
13(e), which provides:
When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect,
or when justice requires, he may by leave of court set
up the counterclaim by amendment.
In support of the motion to add the counterclaim,
Reichert did not attempt to show any circumstances constituting
oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or requirements of
justice, to add a counterclaim that was repugnant to his theory
of the case and his previously sworn affidavit and deposition.
Moreover, his renewed motion, after denial of the motion by Judge
Russon, violated 78-7-19 Utah Code Annotated, which provides:
If an application for an order, made to a judge of
a court in which the action or proceeding is pending,
is refused in whole or in part, or is granted conditionally, no subsequent application for the same order
can be made to any other judge, except of a higher
court; but nothing in this section applies to motions
refused for any informality in the papers or proceeding
necessary to obtain the order or to motions refused
with liberty to renew them.
- 11 -

The motion was made, apparently, because Reichert
finally saw the possibility that his testimony as to a sham
agreement would not be believed.
CONCLUSION
The case was decided correctly by the court of appeals
and there being no basis for review pursuant to Rule 43 of the
rules of this court, the petition for a writ of certiorari should
be denied,
DATED this J^_ day of February 1990.

BryceE Roe (Signed)
Bryce E. Roe
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

1*-

day of February

1990, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) true and
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correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, to:
Ephraim Fankhauser, Esq.
243 East 400 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

BER:013190A
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